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Abstract
What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need
the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much
can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional
way? This paper provides some answers.
1 Introduction
Systems of modal logic have been applied to disciplines of science and humanities for modeling and
reasoning about concepts such as provability, time, necessity and possibility, knowledge and belief.
Each such system has its own set of axioms, specifically chosen for the domain of application it mod-
els. New application domains motivate introduction of new axioms who may be stronger or weaker
than their original peers. Change of axioms is also motivated by development of new mathematical
methods which lead to more refined and efficient versions of the existing axioms. Introduction of
different axioms and logical systems initiates practical and conceptual discussions on minimality is-
sues, for instance whether or not the set of axioms in use is the minimal such set for the domain it
promises to model, or what are the foundational structures we want to model in a domain and are
those reflected in the logical system we use? In this paper, we aim to further elaborate on these issues
for the case of Epistemic Logic.
New application domains.
Epistemic logics have been used by philosophers to reason about knowledge and belief, e.g. Hin-
tikka [10] argues for the modal logic S5 where we have axioms that say our knowledge is truthful
and both positively and negatively introspective. Epistemic logics have also been used by computer
scientists to reason about knowledge of agents in multi-agent systems [7, 16]. This has led to numer-
ous different variations; a dramatic one considers logics with non-monotonic modalities to provide a
solution to the problem of logical omniscience. The need to moreover model the interactions among
the agents and to further reason about the knowledge they acquire as a result of these interactions, has
led to the development of logics of information flow [7, 9, 17, 4, 6]. Very roughly put, these logics
are obtained by enriching the Epistemic logics with temporal operations. They have been extended
to two sorted dynamic epistemic logics which also model dishonest interactions of cheating and lying
in [3, 2]. In this logic, the propositional sort is an S5 Epistemic Logic with a new ’possibly wrong’
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belief modality, which is only conjunction preserving, and the dynamic sort is a PDL-style Dynamic
logic, which has linear operations of sequential composition and choice on actions and the modality
induced by it is not a usual closure type operator.
New mathematical models.
Algebraic methods have been used by mathematical logicians to prove meta-theorems such as decid-
ability and completeness for modal logics. For instance, McKinsey in 1941 and Jonsson and Tarski
in 1951 [13, 12] used Boolean Algebras with operators to prove decidability and completeness of S2
and S4. Through the work of Eilenberg and Mac Lane, algebraic systems have been generalized to
categorical structures whose operational and compositional nature lend themselves to easier proof the-
oretic implementations of logical systems. The compositionality of the categorical approach provides
more refined ways of defining operators on the logical systems. For example, the usual co-closure
modalities of modal logics S4 and S5 can seen as a decomposition of a pair of adjoint maps (f ⊣ g)
whose composition g ◦ f will provide us with an operation which is a co-closure. The f and g maps
themselves can be seen as ‘weaker’ modalities of the logic, in the sense that they obey less truth ax-
ioms, for example they need not in general be idempotent (axiom 4) or reflexive (axiom T ). However,
f is disjunction preserving and g is conjunction preserving and they relate to each other via the rule
of adjunction. These equips f and g with a tidy mathematical axiomatics for reasoning about more
fine-grained aspect of situations, namely those in which the main modality need not be introspective
and truthful. The generality of the categorical approach enables us to systematically weaken the base
propositions of modal logics and for instance work in a Heyting algebra where the negation operator
is weaker than the one in the original Boolean algebras of Jonsson and Tarski, or simply in a lattice
where in general no negation operator is present. We have taken advantage of these bonuses and
have developed an algebraic/categorical semantics to reason about information and mis-information
flow [1, 18]. In this algebra, the propositional logic is a complete lattice and the epistemic and dy-
namic modalities are respectively formed from conjunction and disjunction preserving operators that
are adjoints to one another.
The possibility of introducing different modal logics and different ways of defining modalities
makes us wonder about, and thus bring into question, the minimal set of axioms that makes each such
modality and logic a necessity for the domain they try to model. Our interest lies in the application
domain of reasoning about information (and mis-information) flow where one can ask: what is a
parsimonious logic of information flow that can model interactive scenarios of multi-agent systems?
In other words, what is a minimal set of modal and propositional axioms that enable us to reason
about knowledge and interaction of agents in these systems? Or more profoundly, what would be
the philosophical implications of such a minimal logic?, what kind of concepts can the logic based
on these minimal axioms reason about?, and in short, what are the foundational structures to reason
about information flow? This paper tries to provide some answers.
We start by applying Ockham’s razor to complete Boolean modal algebras. We observe that one
can define weaker modal operators on these algebras, those that are only disjunction or conjunction
preserving and as a result have left and right adjoints respectively. In the presence of a Boolean
negation, another nice connection shows up: the De Morgan duals of these weaker modalities also
become adjoints to each other. Experience shows that most applications of Epistemic logic do not
need all four of these modalities and only use two of them. The traditional approaches rely on negation
and work on a De Morgan dual pair of these modalities. We propose a new thesis and propose to
work with an adjoint pair instead. Thus our base propositional algebra need not have a Boolean
negation: it can be a Heyting Algebra or it can have no negation at all and just be a complete lattice.
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Interestingly enough, fixed points can be defined for our adjoint pair of modalities by closing them
under composition and disjunction and we show that the fixed points of adjoint operators are also
adjoints to each other.
On the application side, we provide new readings for our modalities: as appearance and informa-
tion of agents about the reality. These are weaker than the usual knowledge and belief interpretations
of Epistemic logics. But, and as we shall demonstrate, we can ask for extra conditions on them to
re-gain the traditional modalities of systems K,S4 and S5. However, it would not be very straight-
forward to obtain our modalities from their stronger peers. We then move towards the dynamic
applications and extend our minimal logic with dynamic modalities and show, by means of examples,
how swiftly we can prove more fine-gained and more interesting epistemic properties of multi-agent
scenarios by means of unfolding the adjunctions. Proving these properties enables us to reason about
how the information of agents changes (not necessarily truthfully) as a result of their communication
and based on their appearances. To model the interactions, we first add a pair of adjoint modalities
to model the temporal previous and next states of the system. Then, in a second incremental step, we
index these modalities with labels. The labels stand for actions of multi-agent scenarios and enable
us to model what specific actions evolved the system into its next state. Finally, we observe that our
index set, that is the set of interactions, is more than just a plain set and admits both a monoid and
a sup-lattice structure, In short, it can be seen as a quantale with composition and non-deterministic
choice of actions. Based on this observation, we end by proving how epistemic systems of [1, 18] are
obtained from our incrementally developed real action epistemic algebras by restricting their agents
to the optimistically paranoid ones.
This paper can also be seen as a deductive take on the algebraic semantics of dynamic epistemic
logic as presented in [1, 18]. We demonstrate how the full structure is put together operation by
operation, and what new aspects of application are modeled by each operation. All along, we follow
the same parsimonious strategy for both epistemic and action modalities, our strategy shows that the
reliance of traditional modal and epistemic logics on negation (classical and intuitionistic) can be
waived by using adjoint operators instead. The theoretical study of this minimal modal algebra, its
free construction and equational theory constitutes future work.
2 Ockham’s razor and reasoning about information
Intuitively, a Boolean algebra can be seen as a propositional logic in the following way
• Elements of the algebra b1, b1 ∈ B are logical propositions,
• their join b1 ∨ b2 is the logical disjunction,
• their meet b1 ∧ b2 is the logical conjunction,
• and the partial order between them b1 ≤ b2 is the logical entailment.
The definition of a complete Boolean algebra [5] is as follows
Definition 2.1 A complete Boolean algebra B = (B,
∨
,¬) is a distributive complete lattice (B,
∨
)
with a negation operation, defined by the following axioms
b ∧ ¬b = ⊥, b ∨ ¬b = ⊤
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A complete Boolean algebra has all joins ∨i bi, in particular the empty one ∨ ∅ = ⊥, as a result it
also has all meets
∧
i bi, in particular the empty one
∧
∅ = ⊤. The negation is involutive, that is
¬¬b = b.
A complete Boolean algebra1 is endowed with operators that satisfy certain properties, to obtain
an algebraic [classical] modal logic. In this setting, unary operators will stand for modalities of the
logic. We define a classical modal algebra as follows
Definition 2.2 A classical modal algebra B = (B,
∨
,¬, f) is a complete Boolean algebra (B,
∨
,¬)
endowed with a join preserving operator f : B → B, that is
f(
∨
i
bi) =
∨
i
f(bi), in particular f(⊥) = ⊥
So far we have one modality, that is the f operator, which preserves the disjunctions of the logic. But
recall that in every classical modal algebra (B,
∨
,¬, f), the join preserving operator f : B → B has
a de Morgan dual g : B → B defined as
g(b) := ¬f(¬b)
satisfying
g(
∧
i
bi) =
∧
i
g(bi), in particular g(⊤) = ⊤
So we obtain another modality, that is the g operator, which preserves the conjunctions of the logic.
The categorical methods remind us that in a classical modal algebra (B,
∨
,¬, f), a join preserving
operator f : B → B has a meet preserving Galois right adjoint [14], denoted by f ⊣ f∗ defined as
f∗(b) :=
∨{
b′ ∈ B | f(b′) ≤ b
}
Moreover and in a similar way, the de Morgan dual of f , abbreviated as g, has a join preserving Galois
left adjoint, denoted by g∗ ⊣ g and defined as
g∗(b) :=
∧{
b′ ∈ B | b ≤ g(b′)
}
So we have obtained four modalities: two De Morgan duals and two adjoints. The adjoint operators
f ⊣ f∗ and g∗ ⊣ g satisfy the following rules
f(b) ≤ b′ iff b ≤ f∗(b′), g∗(b) ≤ b′ iff b ≤ g(b′)
As a consequences, the following hold for the composition of adjoints
f(f∗(b)) ≤ b, b ≤ f∗(f(b)), g∗(g(b)) ≤ b, b ≤ g(g∗(b))
There is an interesting cross-dependency between the pair of our De Morgan dual modalities (f, g)
and their adjoints f∗ and g∗, namely that the adjoints to the De Morgan duals are De Morgan duals
of one another. In other words, in a classical modal algebra the de Morgan duality between f and g
lifts to f∗ and g∗ as shown below
1For simplicity of presentation we work with complete lattices, so that for every join preserving operator there exists a
right adjoint. An alternative would be to put aside the completeness criteria and instead ask for existence of adjoints for
each join (meet) preserving operator.
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Proposition 2.3 In a classical modal algebra (B,
∨
,¬, f) the following is true
f∗(b) = ¬g∗(¬b)
where g is the de Morgan dual of f , and we have f ⊣ f∗ and g∗ ⊣ g.
Proof. We show f∗(b) ≤ ¬g∗(¬b) and ¬g∗(¬b) ≤ f∗(b). For the first inequality, start from the
consequence of adjunction f(f∗(b)) ≤ b, by anti-tonicity of negation it follows that ¬b ≤ ¬f(f∗(b)),
by involution of negation this is equivalent to ¬b ≤ ¬f(¬¬f∗(b)), by de Morgan duality between
f and g this is equivalent to ¬b ≤ g(¬f∗(b)), by the adjunction rule between g and g∗ this is iff
g∗(¬b) ≤ ¬f∗(b), which implies f∗(b) ≤ ¬g∗(¬b) by anti-tonicity of negation. Proof of the other
inequality is similar. ✷
Thus in a complete Boolean algebra B = (B,
∨
,¬) asking for f : B → B immediately provides
us with 3 other maps f∗, g, g∗, which form two pairs of adjoint operators and two pairs of de Morgan
dual operators:(
f ⊣ f∗, g∗ ⊣ g
)
,
(
g(−) := ¬f(¬−), g∗(−) := ¬f∗(¬−)
)
If we weaken the base algebra from a Boolean algebra BA to a Heyting algebra HA and thus obtain
an intuitionistic modal algebra, a join preserving f operator gives rise to three other operators, in the
same way as in a Boolean algebra. However, because the Intuitionistic negation defined as ¬l := l→
⊥, for → the left adjoint to ∧, is not involutive, f∗ and g∗ will not be de Morgan duals any more.
Thus by weakening the base algebra we also obtain weaker connections between the operators on the
base. If we continue this weakening and reduce the base algebra to a distributive complete lattice
DL, there is no negation operator present and the f map only gives rise to an f∗, the same is true in a
complete lattice L. The relation between the base algebra and the operators defined on it is depicted
in the table below
Negation De Morgan dual modalities Adjoint modalities
Classical negation (BA, f, g) (BA, f ⊣ f∗)
(BA, f∗, g∗) (BA, g∗ ⊣ g)
Intuitionistic negation (HA, f, g) (HA, f ⊣ f∗)
- (HA, g∗ ⊣ g)
No negation - (DL, f ⊣ f∗)
- -
No negation - (L, f ⊣ f∗)
- -
The modal logic based on the algebra of the last line of the table is weaker than the modal logics
based on the algebras of its above lines, in the sense that it asks for the least set of axioms from its
base algebra and operators. In this case, the base algebra is a complete lattice with only one join
preserving operator. We focus on this algebra as our minimal modal algebra. More formally, we have
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Definition 2.4 An adjoint modal algebra denoted by (L, f ⊣ f∗) is a complete lattice L endowed
with a join preserving map f : L→ L.
The operators f and f∗ and the adjunction f ⊣ f∗ between them can be used to define other pairs
of adjoint maps on the base algebra. For example, closing both f and f∗ under composition and
disjunction provides us with a pair of interesting operators. These closed maps can be seen as special
fixed point operators, which will stay adjoint to each other, via the following result
Proposition 2.5 In any adjoint modal algebra (L, f ⊣ f∗), the following are true
• f i ⊣ f∗ i , ∀i ∈ N, where f i = f · · · f︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
stands for i times self composition of f .
•
∨
i=1 f
i ⊣
∧
i=1 f
∗ i
Proof. f i ⊣ f∗ i is equivalent to f i(l) ≤ l′ iff l ≤ f∗ i(l′), which follows by i times applying
f(l) ≤ l′ iff l ≤ f∗(l′). Similarly,
∨
i=1 f
i ⊣
∧
i=1 f
∗ i is equivalent to
(∨
i=1 f
i
)
(l) ≤ l′ iff l ≤(∧
i=1 f
∗ i
)
(l′), which follows from the definitions of arbitrary meets and joins applied to item one.✷
Operators of the first item above are closed under composition and can be seen as a pair of adjoint
fixed point operators. Operators of the second item above are moreover closed under disjunction and
conjunction respectively and can be seen as a pair of adjoint least and greatest fixed points. One can
make these reflexive by starting the range of i from 0.
We make our modal algebra more suited for epistemic applications by considering a family of
join preserving operators, instead of just one, and thus obtain a multi-modal algebra, defined below
Definition 2.6 A multi-agent adjoint modal algebra (MAMA) denoted by (L, fA ⊣ f∗A)A is a com-
plete lattice L endowed with a family of join preserving maps {fA}A∈A : L→ L.
We refer to this algebra as an epistemic algebra and provide epistemic interpretations for its
modalities: fA(l) is interpreted as ‘appearance of proposition l to agent A’. That is
fA(l) is all the propositions that appear to agent A as possible or true when in reality l is true.
Here are some explanatory examples of our notion of appearance:
• If fA(l) = l then the appearance of agent A about reality is the reality itself, so A’s appearance
is totally compatible with reality.
• If fA(l) = ⊤ then all the propositions of the logic appear as possible to agent A, in other words,
he has no clue about what is going on in reality.
• If l ≤ fA(l), for instance when fA(l) = l ∨ l′, then reality appears as possible to agent A,
although he cannot be sure about it, since l′ also appears equally possible to him.
In each case above, we can also talk about information of agent A, in the following lines
• If fA(l) = l then A’s information about reality is the reality itself, so A is well informed or has
truthful information.
• If fA(l) = ⊤ then A has no information at all about reality.
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• If fA(l) = l ∨ l′, then A’s information about reality includes the reality, but is weaker than it.
Based on the above intuitions, we use the left adjoint f∗A(l) to define our notion of information and
read it as ‘information of agent A about proposition l’, or more propositionally as follows
f∗A(l) is read as ‘agent A is informed that proposition l holds’.
Now we can apply the adjunction rule
fA(l) ≤ l iff l ≤ f∗A(l′)
to produce equivalent information formulae for each appearance case above:
• If fA(l) = l then l ≤ f∗A(l), so l implies that A has truthful information about l.
• If fA(l) = ⊤ then l ≤ f∗A(⊤), so l implies that A has no information about l.
• If fA(l) = l ∨ l′, then l ≤ f∗A(l ∨ l′), so l implies that A is informed that either l or another
proposition l′ hold in reality.
For more examples on appearances consider the following comparisons
• If fA(l) ≤ fB(l) then agent B is more uncertain about l than agent A, since more propositions
appear as possible to him. So we can say that A is more informed or has more information about
proposition l than agent B. An example would be when fB(l) = l ∨ l′ where as fA(l) = l,
clearly l ≤ l ∨ l′ and l ∨ l′ stands for two possibilities for agent B as opposed to the only one
possibility, that is l, for agent A.
• If fA(l) ≤ fA(l′), then agent A is more uncertain about l′ than about l, thus he is more informed
about l than about l′. An example would be when fA(l) = l and fA(l′) = l ∨ l′, so whenever l
is true in reality, A is informed that this is the case, but when l′ is true in reality, his information
does not tell anything useful to him, since he cannot distinguish between l and l′, both appear
to him as equivalently possible.
The above notions of appearance and information are based on weaker modalities than those of
the usual Epistemic logics. They provide new readings for the modalities; readings that stand for new
concepts that Epistemic logics did not account for before. However, in our weaker system, we can
define the stronger epistemic notions of other logics. For instance, the knowledge modality of system
K can now be described as ‘truthful information’ and defined by
KA (l) := f
∗
A(l) ∧ l
So we have
KA (l) is read as ’A has truthful information that l’.
If the appearance maps are weakly idempotent and decreasing (i.e. weak co-closures), then one
obtains the knowledge of system S4.
Proposition 2.7 In a MAMA (L, fA ⊣ f∗A)A, if we have fA(l) ≤ l and fAfA(l) ≤ fA(l) then the
following hold
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• f∗A(l) ≤ f
∗
Af
∗
A(l)
• KA(l) ≤ KAKA(l) and KA(l) = l, for KA(l) := f∗A(l) ∧ l
Proof. For the first one, by the corollary of adjunction we have fAf∗A(l) ≤ l, from this by weak
idempotence of fA and transitivity we have fAfAf∗A(l) ≤ fAf∗A(l) ≤ l and thus it follows that
fAfAf
∗
A(l) ≤ l, which by adjunction is equivalent to f∗A(l) ≤ f∗Af∗A(l). For the second one, we have
to show f∗A(l) ∧ l ≤ f∗A(f∗A(l) ∧ l) ∧ (f∗A(l) ∧ l), which is equivalent to f∗A(l) ∧ l ≤ f∗A(f∗A(l) ∧ l),
that is f∗A(l) ∧ l ≤ f∗Af∗A(l) ∧ f∗A(l), which follows from item one and the adjunction equivalence of
decreasing property of fA, that is l ≤ f∗A(l). The third one easily follows from fA(l) ≤ l, which is
by adjunction equivalent to l ≤ f∗A(l) and by definition of meet we obtain l ∧ f∗A(l) = l, which is
nothing but KA(l) = l. ✷
When L is a complete Boolean algebra, belief is defined as the de Morgan dual of KA, that is
BA(l) := ¬KA(¬l). In this setting, knowledge of the system S5 is obtained by asking for the weak
idempotence and decreasing of appearance maps.
Proposition 2.8 In a MAMA (L, fA ⊣ f∗A)A, if L is a complete Boolean algebra (L,
∨
,¬) and we
have fA(l) ≤ l and fAfA(l) ≤ fA(l) then it follows that
• ¬KA ≤ KA(¬KA(l))
• KA(l) = l.
Proof. Similar to the proof of proposition 2.7.
Similar to proposition 2.5, we define adjoint fixed points for our indexed modalities as below
Proposition 2.9 In any MAMA (L, fA ⊣ f∗A)A for β ⊆ A the following are true
• fβ ⊣ f
∗
β , for fβ :=
∨
B∈β fB and f∗β :=
∧
B∈β f
∗
B.
• f iβ ⊣ f
∗ i
β
•
∨
i=1 f
i
β ⊣
∧
i=1 f
∗ i
β
Proof. For the first direction of the first one assume fβ(l) ≤ l′, by definition of join it follows that
fB(l) ≤ l
′ for all B ∈ β, by adjunction this is iff l ≤ f∗B(l′) for all B ∈ β, by definition of meet it
follows that l ≤ f∗β(l′). Proof of the other direction is similar. The second one follows from i times
unfolding the first one, and the third one from the first two. ✷
These group maps have sensible interpretations in an epistemic context, for example fβ(l) can be
read as ’the appearance of l to all the agents in group β’, similarly f∗β(l) can be read as ’the shared
information of agents in β about l’, or more propositionally as
f∗β(l) is read as ’all the agents in β are informed that l holds.
The former contains the collection or the union of appearances of agents in β about the same propo-
sition l, and can be read as ‘accumulated appearance’. The latter contains the common part or the
intersection of information of agents in β about the same proposition l and can be read as ‘shared
information’. Closing the shared information under composition and conjunction (the third item in
proposition 2.9) provides us with the notion of common information, which is the infinite nested
information of agents about one another’s information:
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∧
i=1 f
∗ i
β (l) is read as ‘all the agents in group β are informed that l, and are also informed
that everyone in the group is informed that l, and so on · · · ’.
The notion of ‘common knowledge among the group β’ in system K is obtained by starting the index
i from 0 rather than 1, that is
CKβ :=
∧
i=0
f∗ iβ = l ∧
∧
i=1
f∗ iβ
In other words, common knowledge among agents in group β can be defined in terms of their common
information as follows
Agents in β have common knowledge that l iff they have truthful common information that l.
Although, weaker than the knowledge and belief modalities of Epistemic logics, appearance and
information modalities can also be used to model epistemic applications and to prove weaker proper-
ties about them. However, and as we will see in the next section, this weakness becomes a necessity
while reasoning about mis-information.
Example 2.10 Consider the following coin toss scenario: in front of agents A and B, agent C throws
a coin and covers it in his palm. We consider a MAMA containing propositions H,T ∈ L. Appear-
ances are set according to uncertainty of agents
fA(H) = fA(T ) = H ∨ T
We show that the information A,B and C have is that the coin is either heads or tails, for example
H ≤ f∗A(H ∨ T )
H ≤ f∗A f
∗
B(H ∨ T )
H ≤ f∗B f
∗
A f
∗
B(H ∨ T )
Consider the second property, by the adjunction rule it holds iff we have fA(H) ≤ f∗B(H ∨ T ), by
assumptions on fA this is equivalent to H ∨T ≤ f∗B(H ∨ T ). By the adjunction rule this holds iff we
have fB(H ∨ T ) ≤ H ∨ T , now since fB is join preserving this is equivalent to fB(H) ∨ fB(T ) ≤
H ∨ T , which is, by assumptions on fB, equivalent to (H ∨ T ) ∨ (H ∨ T ) ≤ H ∨ T , which holds by
the definition of ∨. The proofs of other cases are similar.
3 Ockham’s razor and reasoning about flow of information
To reason about flow of information, we add another modality to our epistemic algebra: the action
modality. This will enable us to prove more properties about scenarios: before we were able to prove
that agents have some information, now we can show how their acquired this information, that is how
their initial information got updated as a result of some communication action taking place among
them. Epistemic algebras could only reason about information, the question is how to enrich them in
a minimal way such that they can also reason about communication.
Information Communication︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇓
Epistemics Dynamics︸ ︷︷ ︸
(L, fA ⊣ f
∗
A)A ??
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The resulting logic is obtained by endowing our MAMA with a new operator to stand for dynamics.
The reasoning power of this algebra is increased by asking the new operator to weakly permute with
the existing epistemic operators. The definition of the new algebra is as follows
Definition 3.1 A temporal epistemic algebra denoted by (L, fA ⊣ f∗A, h ⊣ h∗)A is a multi-agent
adjoint modal algebra (L, fA ⊣ f∗A)A endowed with a join preserving map h : L → L, such that the
following permutation holds
fA h(l) ≤ h fA(l)
We read h∗(l) as
‘In the next state of the system l holds’.
Hence h∗f∗A(l) is read as
‘In the next state of the system agent A gets informed that l holds.
Similarly, h(l) is read as ‘in the previous state of the system l held’. The permutation axiom of
the algebra is a weak permutation between the two operators and demonstrates a preservation or no-
miracle condition on the information: if an agent obtains some information in the next state of the
system, it should be the case that this information existed in the system previously, thus the acquired
information should somehow be implied by the previous information. In other words, information is
not generated and cannot be destroyed freely and without a cost, it can only be accumulated. This
axiom is similar to the appearance-update axiom of [1, 18] and also corresponds to a weaker version
of the action-knowledge axiom of [2, 3]. A similar axiom can also be found in the Epistemic Temporal
Logic of [7] in the name of perfect recall.
According to proposition 2.9, a temporal fixed point operator can be defined as
∧
i h
∗ i(l) and
interpreted as follows
’Eventually in some future state of the system proposition l holds’.
Rather than reasoning about whether an information property holds in the next state of the system,
it would be more sensible to name and reason about the action that led the system to its next state, the
action that caused the information property to hold in the next state of the system. To do so, we endow
our temporal epistemic algebra with a family of operators that are indexed over a set of actions. The
passage from one temporal operator to a family of action operators is similar to the passage from the
mono-modal epistemic algebras to the multi-agent ones. The new setting is defined as follows
Definition 3.2 An action epistemic algebra denoted by (L, fA ⊣ f∗A, ha ⊣ h∗a)A,Act is a multi-
agent adjoint modal algebra (L, fA ⊣ f∗A)A endowed with a family of join preserving maps
{ha}a∈Act : L→ L, such that
fA ha(l) ≤ ha fA(l)
We read h∗a(l) as
‘After action a proposition l holds’.
Similarly, h∗a f∗A(l) is read as
‘After action a agent A gets informed that l holds’.
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The fixed point of the action operator
∧
i h
∗ i
α , for α ⊆ Act is interpreted as
‘Eventually after the actions in α proposition l holds’.
We end this section by describing two restrictions that will bring our algebras closer to the specific
application domain in mind. These restrictions have been introduced and discussed in detail in the
algebra of [1, 18], and correspond to similar restrictions in the dynamic epistemic logic of [2, 3]. The
main point is that the actions that we are interested in reasoning about are the communication actions
that take place in epistemic scenarios. These do not change the facts of the world and are of the form
of announcements to a group of agents of a propositional or epistemic content. In order to model
them, we ask for the following two axioms, for a ∈ CAct ⊆ Act and φ ∈ Φ ⊆ L
l ∈ ker(a) iff ha(l) ≤ ⊥
l ≤ φ iff ha(l) ≤ φ
We refer to CAct as the communication actions and to Φ as the ’facts’ of the system. The first
axiom says that each communication action a ∈ CAct has a kernel ker(a), which stands for its ‘co-
content’, that is all the propositions to which the action cannot be applied. The second axiom says
that if a proposition l entails a fact φ, that is l ≤ φ then a communication actions a does not have any
effect on this entailment, that is ha(l) ≤ φ.
Example 3.3 As an example, consider again the coin toss scenario where agent C uncovers the coin
and announces: ‘the coin is heads’. The announcement is a communication action a ∈ CAct that
appears as it is to all the agents since it is a public action, so fA(a) = fB(a) = fC(a) = a. The
kernel of this action is T , since it cannot apply when the coin has come down tails. The set of facts in
this scenario is {H,T}.
We want to show that after this announcement the uncertainty of agents gets waived and for
instance A will acquire information that the coin is heads, that is
H ≤ h∗af
∗
A(H)
By the adjunction rule on h∗a this holds iff ha(H) ≤ f∗A(H), by the adjunction rule on f∗A, this holds
iff fAha(H) ≤ H . By the no-miracle axiom it suffices to show hafA(H) ≤ H . By the assumptions
on fA(H) this is equivalent to ha(H ∨ T ) ≤ H . Since ha is join preserving this is equivalent to
showing ha(H)∨ha(T ) ≤ H . By definition of ∨ in a lattice it suffices to show the following two case{
ha(H) ≤ H
ha(T ) ≤ H
The first case follows since H is a fact and thus ha(H) = H and in a partial order we have that
H ≤ H . The second case follows since T ∈ ker(aH), which means aH(T ) = ⊥, thus ⊥ ≤ H .
Other nested information properties such as the following ones are proved in a similar fashion
H ≤ h∗af
∗
Af
∗
C(H), H ≤ h
∗
af
∗
Af
∗
B(H)
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4 Ockham’s razor and reasoning about flow of mis-information
In the closer-to-real life versions of the scenarios of multi-agent systems, agents are not always honest
and thus communication actions are not always truthful. We would like to be able to reason about
these scenarios and model the cheating and lying actions of dishonest agents. In order to do this, and
following the approaches of [1, 2, 3, 18], we introduce epistemic structure on actions. Similar to the
epistemic structure on propositions, these will stand for ’appearances of agents about actions’. Also
similar to the epistemic structure on propositions, these are added by endowing the set of actions Act
with a family of appearance maps f ′A : Act→ Act, one for each agent. The new algebras are defined
below
Definition 4.1 A real action epistemic algebra denoted by (L, fA ⊣ f∗A, ha ⊣ h∗a)A,(Act,f ′A⊣(f ′A)∗)A
is an action epistemic algebra (L, fA ⊣ f∗A, ha ⊣ h∗a)A,Act where the set of actions Act is endowed
with a family of join preserving maps {f ′A}A∈A : Act→ Act, and we have
fA ha(l) ≤ hf ′
A
(a) fA(l)
The no-miracle axiom now becomes a no-miracle axiom up to the appearance of actions, that is if an
agent acquires new information after an action, this information is based on the state of the system
before the action and also the appearance of the agent about that action.
Example 4.2 Consider the coin toss scenario, we show that if C’s announcement was not honest
and he lied about the face of the coin, that is announced heads when he saw tails, A and B, who
did not notice and neither suspect the lying, will acquire wrong information. The lying action is a
communication action a ∈ CAct that appears as it is to the announcer C , that is f ′C(a) = a, but
since A and B do not suspect it they think it is an honest announcement that is f ′A(a) = f ′B(a) = a.
The kernel of the lying action is H since it could not be a lie if the coin had actually landed heads. In
this lying scenario we can show, for example, the following properties
H ≤ h∗af
∗
C(T ), H ≤ h
∗
af
∗
A(H), H ≤ h
∗
af
∗
Af
∗
C(H)
Properties of this and other examples, such as the muddy children puzzle with cheating and lying, are
proved using the same strategy as in the honest versions demonstrated. In the muddy children one
needs to repeat the kernel argument for the number of dirty children in the puzzle minus 2.
Consider the third property, by adjunction on h∗a, f∗A and f∗C respectively, it is equivalent to
fC fA ha(H) ≤ H . By the no-miracle axiom between fA and ha it suffices to show
fC hf ′
A
(a) fA(H) ≤ H
which is equivalent to fC ha fA(H) ≤ H since f ′A(a) = a. By the no-miracle axiom this time between
fC and ha, it suffices to show hf ′
C
(a) fC fA(H) ≤ H , which is equivalent to hafCfA(H) ≤ H since
f ′C(a) = a. We substitute values for fA and fC and need to show ha(H ∨ T ) ≤ H . By distributivity
and definition of join this is obtained by showing two cases{
ha(H) ≤ H
ha(T ) ≤ H
The second case holds since T is in the kernel of a, and thus ha(T ) = ⊥ ≤ H , the first case follows
similar to the previous example and by preservation of facts.
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Two observations are in place here:
• The family of indexed unary maps {ha}a∈Act : L→ L is equivalent to the binary operation
h : L×Act→ L .
• There is some implicit structure on the set of actions: they can be sequentially composed a•a′,
non-deterministically chosen a ∨ a′, and there is a neutral action 1 in which nothing happens
1•a = a •1 = a. Assuming the existence of all the choices (joins) and their distributivity over
the composition, permits us to form a quantale of actions Q = (Q,
∨
, •, 1)2.
The index sets of a real action epistemic algebra make the structure a bit too crowded, especially
the index set of actions which is itself indexed over the set of agents. The situation can be improved
by considering instead two separate multi-agent adjoint modal algebras: one for the propositions
(L, fA ⊣ f
∗
A)A and another one for the actions (Act, f ′A ⊣ (f ′)∗A)A where the latter acts on the former
via the binary counterpart of the ha operators, that is via the binary operation of h : L × Act → L.
It is easy to show that the equivalence mentioned in the first observation above lifts to one between a
real action epistemic algebra and these two MAMA’s. Formally speaking we have
Proposition 4.3 A real action epistemic algebra
(L, fA ⊣ f
∗
A, ha ⊣ h
∗
a)A,(Act,f ′
A
⊣(f ′
A
)∗)A
is equivalent to (
(L, fA ⊣ f
∗
A)A, (Act, f
′
A ⊣ (f
′)∗A)A, h
)
whenever h : L×Act→ L is the binary equivalent of {ha}a∈Act : L→ L.
Proof. Follows directly from the equivalence of observation 1 above. In particular the join preserva-
tion of ha, that is ha(
∨
i li) =
∨
i ha(li) lifts to h(
∨
i li, a) =
∨
i h(li, a) and the permutation between
ha and fA, that is fAha(l) ≤ hf ′
A
(a)fA(l) lifts to fAh(l, a) ≤ h(fA(l), f ′A(a)). ✷
So far we are able to reason about the information acquired by agents as a result of atomic actions
taking place among them. The information acquired by composition of actions can also be taken care
of by composing the action operators, for example hahbf∗A(l) says that after doing action a followed
by action b, agent A is informed that l. What is missing is reasoning about the information after a
choice of actions, for example to express what an agent would acquire if either action a or action b
take place. If we move from the plain set of actions Act to the quantale of actions (Act,
∨
, •, 1), we
obtain an algebraic structure on the actions which enables us to as well reason about non-deterministic
choices of actions. What will happen to the appearance maps? For example, given the appearance
of atomic actions a, b in Act, what would be the appearance of the choice of actions a ∨ b, and their
composition a • b? The most natural and neutral way of extending appearance maps to choice of
actions is point-wisely, that is making the appearance of the non-deterministic choice be equal to the
choice of the appearances
f ′A(
∨
i
ai) =
∨
i
f ′A(ai)
How about with regard to the sequential composition and its unit? This depends on what kind of
agents do we want to model. For instance, we may decide to consider it possible for our agents
2This can be, for instance, the powerset of the free monoid generated on Act, that is P(Act∗).
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to be paranoid, that is, when nothing is happening in reality, it appears to them that something is
happening. In this case, we do not need to ask for any extra inequalities between 1 and f ′A(1). Since,
for example, f ′A(1) can be equal to any action a, and in general there is no order relation between 1
and an arbitrary action a. However, this may be a bit too strong of an assumption, we can weaken it
by asking the agents to be optimistically paranoid. That is, when nothing is happening in reality, it
appears to them that either nothing is happening or something is happening. In other words, we ask
that appearance to all agents of the action in which nothing happens always include it, that is
1 ≤ f ′A(1)
It is then easy to show (see [1, 18]) that this inequality will lead us to an inequality on the appearance
of a sequential composition, that is f ′A(a • b) ≤ f ′A(a) • f ′A(b). There is a third possibility and that is
when the agents are not paranoid at all. In other words, whenever nothing is happening in reality, it
appears to them that nothing is happening. So their appearance of 1 is equal to 1
1 = f ′A(1)
This inequality will force the appearance of the sequential composition to be equal to the sequential
composition of the appearances, that is. It will also force our permutation axiom to be equality rather
than inequality, that is
f ′A(a • b) = f
′
A(a) • f
′
A(b) , fAha(l) = hf ′
A
(a)fA(l)
However, since the goal of this paper is to stay minimal in the axioms of the algebra and that inequality
is weaker than equality, it is reasonable to work with the inequality versions of axioms and assume
that our agents are optimistically paranoid. A more detailed discussion of these and other attitudes of
agents and their relation to axioms of the algebra is well in place, but out of the limits of the current
paper.
Let us end by defining the notion of a quantale endowed with appearance maps for optimistically
paranoid agents and show how it will help us relate our system to the other algebra of information
and mis-information flow.
Definition 4.4 An epistemic quantale denoted by (Q, f ′A ⊣ f ′∗A )A is a multi-agent adjoint modal
algebra where Q is a quantale and moreover we have
1 ≤ f ′A(1) , f
′
A(a • b) ≤ f
′
A(a) • f
′
A(b)
The epistemic systems of [1, 18] are obtained from the two sorted structure of proposition 4.3 as
follows
Proposition 4.5 The pair
(
(L, fA ⊣ f
∗
A)A, (Q, f
′
A ⊣ f
′∗
A )A, h
)
is an epistemic system whenever
(L, fA ⊣ f
∗
A)A is a MAMA, (Q, f ′A ⊣ f ′∗A )A is an epistemic quantale, the pair is equivalent to a
real action epistemic algebra (L, fA ⊣ f∗A, ha ⊣ h∗a)A,(Act,f ′A⊣(f ′A)∗)A and moreover h satisfies thefollowing
h(l,
∨
i
ai) =
∨
i
h(l, ai), h(l, 1) = l, h(l, a • b) = h(h(l, a), b)
Proof. Follows from definition 4.5 and proposition 4.3. ✷
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a minimal algebraic modal logic where modalities are not necessarily positively
or negatively introspective, that is they do not in general obey axioms 4 and 5 of modal logic, neither
are they in general truthful, that is obey axiom T . The only condition on them is preservation of
disjunctions or conjunctions of their base propositional setting. The propositional setting is also weak:
it has neither implication nor negation, and is not necessarily distributive. Lack of negation means
that our modalities are not de Morgan duals, but they are connected to each other in a weaker sense
and as adjoints. These minimal modalities can be interpreted as new modes such as ‘information’ and
‘appearance’, from which belief and truthful knowledge can be derived. We have defined fixed point
operators for these modalities such that the pair of fixed points are also adjoints. The applicability of
our logic is demonstrated via examples of epistemic scenarios. This weak setting can be extended to
also model the flow of information, be it caused by the passage of time or by application of actions.
Actions can have some extra structure on them to model cheating and lying, sequential composition
and non-deterministic choice. All of these can be modularly added to the weak modal algebra we
started with. At the end, we show how restricting our agents to the optimistically paranoid ones
allows us to obtain the structure of an epistemic system, developed in previous work as the algebraic
semantics of Dynamic Epistemic Logic.
One needs to study the universal algebraic properties of our weak modal algebras in the lines
of [8]; that if they have an equational theory, how can they be freely generated, what does their rela-
tional semantics look like, how to develop a Stone-like duality for them, etc. One possible challenge
might lie in the rule of adjunction f(l) ≤ l′ iff l ≤ f∗(l′), which is not an equation. The equations
are obtained from composing the adjoints, for example f ◦ f∗(l) ≤ l and (f ◦ f∗)2 = f ◦ f∗, but
those are not of rank 1.
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